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SEASON’S GREETINGS 
 
 
The staff at the Police Academy 
would like to wish our “In-
Service:10-8” readers and their 
families all the best for this 
holiday season. It has been a 
pleasure serving British Columbia’s police officers by 
bringing them up-to-date on many of the issues facing 
them daily as they go about their arduous duties 
protecting the citizens of their communities. May this 
holiday season bring you good cheer and all the best in 
the New Year. Have a safe and happy holiday. 
Remember, in God we trust, all others we run on CPIC!!! 
 
TOP COURT RULES STRIP 
SEARCHES PRESUMPTIVELY 
UNREASONABLE 
R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83 
Toronto police had an operation 
underway involving a number of 
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accused’s buttocks as well as a white substance within 
the wrap. The accused was flexing the muscles of his 
buttocks in order to prevent the officers from 
retrieving the package. On the landing at the top of a 
flight of stairs there was some physical interaction 
between the accused and the officers. An officer 
testified that the accused pushed him at one point and 
that he almost went down the stairs. The officer 
thereupon pushed the accused against the wall face-
first. There being concern that the landing was not a 
safe place in which to continue to search, and not 
wishing to go down a flight of steps, the officers 
brought the accused into the store.  They excluded the 
patrons from the shop and secured the premises. The 
sole employee present remained in the shop. In a back 
area of the shop they had the accused bend over a 
table. From the street, it would have been possible to 
see only one of the accused’s legs. The officers once 
again tried to retrieve the package. The accused was 
still using his muscles in such a way as to hold onto it. 
The accused then accidentally defecated. An officer 
found some dish gloves in the shop that he put on. He 
then succeeded in retrieving the package. 
V
Dofficers in an area where drug 
trafficking was known to take 
place. A police officer using a 
elescope was located in an unoccupied building 
pproximately 70 feet across the street from a 
andwich shop.  The officer had a clear view into the 
hop and could see what went on there. He witnessed 
wo transactions in which people went into the shop, 
eceiving from the accused a white substance. The 
fficer saw the accused take the substance, believed 
o be cocaine, out of his hand with the thumb and 
orefinger and give it to the others.  After the second 
ransaction, the officer transmitted to other members 
f the team a description of the accused. Two other 
fficers entered the shop and arrested the accused.  
ne of the officers patted down the accused, looked in 
is pockets and found nothing. The officers then 
pened a door leading to the basement and brought the 
ccused there and continued the search.  An officer 
ulled back the accused’s pants and underwear. Looking 
own, he saw some clear plastic wrap between the 
The accused was convicted of possession of a narcotic 
for the purpose of trafficking and appealed his 
conviction on the basis that the evidence should have 
been excluded pursuant to ss. 8 and 24 of the Charter. 
The majority of the Court examined the long-standing 
common law rule respecting the power to search 
incidental to arrest. In reviewing the jurisprudence, 
the Court continued to recognize that searches 
conducted in the absence of a warrant are prima facie 
unreasonable, although a search performed incidental 
to arrest is an exception to this presumption. At 
common law, the police have the right to search an 
arrested person for weapons or evidence related to the 
arrest. Although a search incidental to arrest does not 
generally require reasonable grounds beyond the 
grounds necessary to support the arrest, the Court 
carved out an exemption to this common rule in cases 
of strip searches. In identifying strip searches as 
representing a significant invasion of privacy, and often 
humiliating, degrading, and traumatic experiences, the 
majority held that to undertake this type of intrusive 
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 search, the officer must possess reasonable grounds 
justifying the strip search in addition to justifying the 
arrest.  Strip searches carried out as a matter of 
routine or policy, or abusively or for the purpose of 
humiliating or punishing the arrestee will be 
unreasonable. Furthermore, the Court stated that strip 
searches should be conducted at the police station 
unless there are exigencies requiring the search be 
conducted in the field. For practical purposes, the 
following points are noteworthy: 
 
• The common law power to search incident to arrest 
does include the power to strip search. 
• Although permissible as an incident to arrest, strip 
searches are presumptively unreasonable and the 
onus lies with the police in justifying the search. 
• In conducting a strip search the police must 
possess reasonable grounds that the search is 
necessary for safety or evidentiary concerns. 
These reasonable grounds are independent from 
the grounds justifying the arrest. Mere possibility 
that a person has weapons or evidence upon their 
person is insufficient. 
• Searches conducted as a matter of routine or 
policy, or to humiliate or punish are unreasonable. 
• There is a distinction between strip searches on 
arrest and strip searches related to safety in full 
custodial settings such as a prison. The 
appropriateness of routine strip searches of 
individuals integrated into a prison population 
cannot be used to justify strip searches of 
individuals briefly detained by police or held 
overnight in cells. Although police officers have 
legitimate concerns that short term detainees may 
conceal weapons, these concerns cannot justify 
routine strip searches of all arrestees and must be 
addressed on a case-by-case basis. 
• Strip searches are to be generally conducted at a 
police station except in cases of exigent 
circumstances where the police have reasonable 
grounds to believe that the search is necessary in 
the field such as an urgency to search for weapons 
that could be used to harm the officer, others, or 
the arrestee. 
• A person should be provided the opportunity to 
remove items themselves or the assistance or 
advice of trained medical professionals should be 
sought to ensure material can be safely removed. 
 
In this case, the majority found the manner in which 
the search was conducted unreasonable. Firstly, the 
officer lacked independent grounds to believe the 
accused had weapons or evidence secreted on his body. 
Secondly, the officer lacked reasonable grounds that 
the search needed to be carried out at the scene. 
Finally, even though the accused resisted the officer’s 
attempts to remove the package by clenching his 
buttocks, the way the search was carried out 
demonstrated considerable disregard for the accused’s 
dignity and physical integrity. As a result, an acquittal 
was entered.  
 
Editor’s Note: It is important for officers to 
recognize that this case applies to a specific type of 
search, a strip search, and does not apply to the pat 
down or other area searches police officers encounter 
on a daily basis. Those types of searches, such as 
searching a vehicle in the control of an arrested 
person, do not require independent grounds to believe 
that weapons or evidence will be located and they 
continue to be an exemption to the presumption 
requiring a warrant provided there are reasonable 
grounds justifying the arrest.  
 
Complete case available at www.lexum.umontreal.ca/ 
csc-scc. 
 
ARREST FOLLOWING CONSENT 
ENTRY LAWFUL: BREATH 
TESTS ADMISSIBLE 
R. v. Grothiem, 2001 SKCA 116 
 
A police officer received a 
complaint that a vehicle had 
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responded and found a damaged 
evergreen but no vehicle nor any 
debris. The officer noted tire tracks in front of the 
tree and a fluid stain on the pavement. A trail of fluid 
and a long black skid mark lead up a nearby driveway. 
The officer saw a half ton truck in the driveway and 
upon going over to look, observed that the front end of 
the truck had extensive damage. The officer knocked 
on the door of the house, knowing that the accused 
lived there with a number of roommates, to ask them 
about the accident. Someone yelled, “Come in”.  
 
The officer entered, smelled alcohol, heard someone 
shout “cops”, and noticed three men with whom he was 
familiar.  One of the men had blood on his forehead and 
hand, and his injuries were being attended to by his 
mother. The accused appeared, was unsteady on his 
2
 feet, and looked drunk to the officer. The accused 
immediately presented the officer with a work-order 
relating to the truck’s steering and was about to 
explain what happened when the officer asked the 
accused who was driving the vehicle. The accused 
stated he had been driving and accidentally ran into 
the tree while turning into the driveway. Based on 
previous dealings with the accused and his demeanour, 
gait, slurred speech, and bloodshot eyes, the officer 
concluded the accused was intoxicated and was going to 
take him into custody for impaired driving causing 
bodily harm.  
 
Fearing the other men might intervene if he 
confronted the accused in the house, the officer 
placed his hand on the accused’s arm and suggested the 
two step outside or go to the police car to discuss the 
matter. The accused brushed the officer’s hand aside 
and braced himself against the door jam, suggesting 
through his actions he was not going to accompany the 
officer willingly. The officer grabbed the accused and 
pulled him through the doorway, hastily advising him he 
was under arrest and of his right to counsel. Once at 
the car, the officer read the demand and fully 
informed the accused of his right to counsel. The 
accused was transported to the police station, 
exercised his right to counsel, and provided breath 
samples over the legal limit. 
 
At his trial, the accused argued the results of the 
breath tests should be excluded because the officer 
violated the accused rights by arresting him in his 
home. The trial judge found the officer had been 
lawfully in the accused’s home and had made a lawful 
arrest. The accused appealed, and the Court of Queen’s 
Bench, although satisfied the officer was lawfully in 
the home, found the arrest to be unnecessary because 
the officer had identified the driver and could have 
achieved breath samples by demand alone (without 
arrest) and inappropriate because the arrest in a home 
absent exigent circumstances was a grave matter. In 
holding that the officer “should have left the premises 
and attempted to obtain an arrest warrant…”, the 
Appeal Court judge found the arrest unjustified, 
contrary to s.9 of the Charter, and excluded the 
results of the breath tests. The conviction for driving 
while over 80mg% was set aside. 
 
On appeal by the Crown, the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal divided the issues of the constitutionality of 
the officer’s actions along three lines: 
• the lawfulness of the officer’s presence in the home 
at the time of arrest 
• whether the arrest itself was lawful 
• whether the arrest, even if lawful, constituted an 
arbitrary detention 
 
Lawful Presence? 
 
The Court found the officer was lawfully present in the 
home of the accused at the time of arrest. Cameron, 
J.A. for a unanimous Court stated: 
… [the officer] was lawfully in the home at the time of 
the arrest.  He went to the door not for the purpose of 
making an arrest-or of conducting a search or seizure-
but for the purpose alone of talking to the occupants 
about the apparent accident.  That was his 
intention.  And, on knocking on the door he was invited 
in.  In advance of his being invited in, he had been seen 
by the occupants driving up and down the street in the 
police car and [the accused] had readied his work-order 
to present to the policeman.  So the constable's presence 
at the door, as a police officer, was more or less 
expected.  Still he was invited in.  During the short time 
he was there prior to the arrest, neither [the accused] 
nor any of the others had told him to leave.  Taken 
together, these facts make for a lawful presence in the 
home 
The importance of the fact the police officer was 
present in the home lawfully lies in what would otherwise 
have been a trespass and an illegal entry, accompanied by 
a violation of [the accused’s] expectations of privacy in 
relation to his home and by an in-home arrest without 
warrant. Had that been the case, the first of the 
questions in issue would have taken on a decidedly 
different complexion in keeping, for example, with R. v. 
Feeney, …. As it is, however, the central principles of 
that case are not engaged. (references omitted) 
Lawful Arrest? 
 
An arrest made pursuant to s.495(1)(a) of the Criminal 
Code for an indictable offence will be lawful if the 
officer had reasonable grounds the accused committed 
the offence. Since impaired driving causing bodily harm 
is a strictly indictable offence and not one found in 
s.553 of the Code, the officer need not consider 
s.495(2) (public interest), at least at the time the 
arrest is made. In determining whether the officer 
possessed the requisite grounds upon which to justify 
the arrest, the Court reviewed the applicable standard, 
and at para.30 stated: 
 
This requirement … requires that police officers 
personally believe they have reasonable and probable 
grounds for an arrest and that reasonable and probable 
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 grounds in fact exist.  Whether such grounds in fact 
exist depends upon whether a reasonable person, 
standing in the shoes of the police officer, would have 
believed that there were reasonable and probable 
grounds for making an arrest. 
 
And further, at para.42: 
 
The question of reasonable and probable grounds depends 
upon a bona fide reasonable belief in a state of facts 
that, if true, would justify the course taken.  That the 
supposed fact proves not to exist does not render the 
belief unreasonable…  Second, the assessment did not fall 
to be made on the basis a prima facie case in relation to 
each element of the suspected offence has to be made 
out… (references omitted) 
 
In this case, the Court found the officer believed in 
good faith that the accused had committed the 
offence of impaired driving (based on the accused’s 
condition, the fact and nature of the accident, and the 
officer’s experience with the accused on prior 
occasions) and that bodily harm resulted (based on an 
inference the officer made from the male bleeding 
about the forehead and blood on his hand).  
 
Arbitrary Arrest? 
 
In finding the arrest lawful under subsection 495(1)(a) 
of the Code, the Court found the reasonable ground 
standard “serves to shield an arrest, made in 
accordance with the requirements of subsection 
495(1)(a) and suffering no other defect, from attack 
on the basis of arbitrariness, at least at the point the 
arrest is made”.  
 
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal set aside the 
judgement of the Court of Queen’s bench and restored 
the conviction. 
 
ENTRY INTO DWELLING 
TECHNICAL VIOLATION: 
CONFESSION ADMITTED 
R. v. M.C.G., 2001 MBCA 178 
 
Two police officers attended the 
opened by a woman, the sister of the young offender. 
As a police officer spoke to the woman, the young 
offender came up a stairway to the entrance hall where 
the officers were standing. It was unclear how the 
officers came to be in the hallway. The officers did not 
claim they were expressly invited in, however they did 
not force their way in nor take advantage of an open 
door. The Court found it was likely that, “as often 
happens with Winnipeg’s cold climate, no impediment 
was placed in their way in order that the conversation 
might take place in greater comfort”. An officer 
informed the young offender of the outstanding 
warrant and asked if the young offender was willing to 
come to police headquarters to deal with the matter. 
The youth replied “sure” and the officer also told him 
that police wanted to speak to him about some other 
robberies. The Court framed this encounter in the 
following manner, at para. 7: 
 
At no time did the police officers stray beyond the 
entrance hall.  They did not tell the young offender 
directly that he need not agree to accompany them, but 
the words spoken were clearly in the nature of a request 
rather than a demand.  There was no attempt to place 
the young offender under arrest until he had agreed to 
accompany them to headquarters. 
 
Once at police headquarters, the young offender made 
a full confession of his involvement in two robberies 
after being provided his full Charter rights and the 
additional rights accorded to young offenders. The 
young offender sought to have his confession excluded 
as it was the product of a s.8 violation; the entry of 
the police into the residence. 
 
Two appeal court judges, in the absence of clearer 
evidence, were unable to conclude that the officers 
had “informed consent” to enter the dwelling.  
“Assuming” there was a breach of s.8 of the Charter, 
the majority concluded, “any Charter violation was of a 
technical nature”. Turning to the young offender’s 
application to exclude the confession, the majority 
held, at para. 21: 
 
Finally, in my opinion, the circumstances surrounding the 
arrest of the young offender do not constitute a serious apartment of a young offender. The 
officers were aware the young 
offender had a warrant for his 
arrest for failure to appear in court 
on a robbery charge. The officers did not possess the 
warrant and it did not authorize forced entry into a 
residence. The officers knocked on the door and it was 
Charter breach.  The police officers acted in good 
faith.  They did not mislead.  They did not overstep what 
they believed to be a tacit invitation to cross the 
threshold.  The arrest occurred only after the young 
offender agreed to accompany them to deal with the 
subject-matter of the outstanding warrant and to 
discuss other matters.  It was implicit in the language 
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 used that the young offender had the right to 
refuse.  No force was exercised by the police. 
 
The confession was admitted. Kroft, J.A. of the Court 
agreed with the disposition of the appeal by the 
majority, but disagreed that there was even a technical 
breach of the Charter regarding police entry, and at 
para.27 stated: 
 
I must say, however, that in my opinion, there was no 
unlawful arrest or breach of s. 8, even of a technical 
nature.  I am unable to see how this case can turn on 
whether the arrest of the young offender took place on 
one side of the door sill or the other.   
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“It seems reasonable that a police officer should be 
given some freedom to exercise his discretion, based 
on experience and knowledge, to determine if there are 
reasonable grounds and should not be subject to 
constant supervision. A police officer can only do his 
job if he is given some flexibility and can exercise his 
own judgment1”. B.C. Co.Crt. Justice Campbell 
 
 
ISP ACTING AS AGENT IN 
FORWARDING E-MAIL TO 
POLICE 
R. v. Weir, 2001 ABCA 181 
 
An Internet Service Provider (ISP), 
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The Alberta Court of Appeal held the ISP was not an 
agent of the state at the time it opened the e-mail and 
before its contact with the police. However, the ISP 
was acting as an agent when it sent a copy of the 
message to police at the officer’s request; thus there 
was a warrantless search. In upholding the validity of 
the warrant, the Court found the information “obtained 
from this warrantless search was nothing more than a 
confirmation of the information…already received from 
the employees of the ISP”. In short, even without this 
confirmatory information there still remained 
sufficient cause to issue the warrant. The warrant was 
valid and the evidence was admissible. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca. 
 
POLICE INTERVENTION 
CHECKLIST FOR 
ENDANGERMENT 
Part 6 of 6 
Mr. Richard Dolman 
The following notes are from an Internet website 
under development at the Justice Institute of British 
Columbia to assist police in handling a psychiatric crisis 
and to promote wider understanding of mental illness. 
The project was initiated by the BC Association of 
Chiefs of Police Mental Health Committee, and 
supported by a multi-agency group. Funding is from the 
Ministry of Health Services and the Justice Institute. 
V
Dwho at the request of the accused 
was conducting a routine repair of 
the accused’s electronic mailbox, 
iscovered an e-mail message that appeared to contain 
hild pornography and called police. Police requested 
he ISP forward a copy of this message. The police, 
sing this information, obtained a search warrant for 
he accused’s residence and seized the accused’s CPU 
nd some diskettes that contained child pornography. 
ncluded in this data were the attachments from the 
riginal message forwarded to the police from the ISP. 
he accused was convicted at trial but appealed his 
onviction arguing the ISP acted as an agent of the 
tate in both opening and in providing the police with 
he initial e-mail which provided the basis for the 
arrant and therefore his right to be secure against 
nreasonable search or seizure was violated.  
                                                
 R. v. Gordon [1984] B.C.J. No. 1200 (B.C.Co.Crt.) 
Comments and suggestions to the author are welcome 
at: almond@direct.ca 
One of the key decisions police need to make when 
intervening under sec.28(1) of the Mental Health Act 
(MHA) is whether the subject’s behaviour is “likely to 
endanger” themselves or others. If the answer is yes, 
and the subject appears to have a mental disorder (as 
described in Part 5 of this series), then police may 
apprehend and transport the person to hospital. The 
degree of apparent mental disorder must be more than 
eccentricity or odd ideas.  The MHA says it must 
cause serious impairment of the subject’s ability to 
react appropriately to their environment, or to 
associate with others.  A suicide attempt, violence or 
psychosis are strong examples.   
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The degree of endangerment is not defined for police 
purposes in the MHA, but includes likely endangerment 
as well as actual immediate danger. Here are examples 
 of endangerment, followed by key questions and 
answers: 
• Apparent or actual attempt at suicide or serious 
self-harm. 
• Strong suicidal or self-harm ideas or impulses, with 
history of previous attempts or with a plan. 
• Unprovoked threats of violence or committing 
unprovoked violence to self or others.  
• Causing or inviting unprovoked serious injury or 
damage to self or others.  
• Taking uncontrolled and reckless risks to physical 
well-being.   
• Suffering - Gross self-neglect causing poor 
personal hygiene, injury, infection, starvation, or 
abuse  
• Acting or likely to act unsafely due to command 
hallucinations (feels compelled by 
dangerous/harmful voices or visions to engage in 
unsafe behavior).  
• Acting or likely to act unsafely on delusional 
beliefs (examples: Paranoia - “enemies, aliens.” 
Grandiosity - “special powers,” superhuman). 
• Unsafe status increased by:  a) Undiagnosed or 
unmedicated mental disorder with increasing 
symptoms; b) Psychiatric symptoms are coupled 
with chronic intoxication - drug or alcohol abuse; 
or with treatment failure; or lack of support from 
health care system; or severe stresses in daily life; 
c) Previous history of high-risk or violent behavior 
or disabling symptoms; d) Pattern of deteriorating 
mental and physical health; e) Previous mental 
crisis, previous hospitalization; f) Family/friends 
concerned about changes in habits, behavior or 
moods. 
 
Q: Is there a duty to warn to protect public 
safety? Yes. If a subject with an apparent mental 
disorder seriously threatens a specific person or group, 
then police have a duty to protect public safety. 
Others, including health professionals also may have an 
ethical or legal duty to warn or protect public safety, 
which over-rides privacy concerns. BC privacy 
legislation does not prevent public agencies from 
releasing client information to third parties where the 
client consents, or the info will be used for the same 
purpose for which it was collected (e.g. continuity of 
care), or in compelling circumstances that affect 
anyone’s health or safety (see Appendix N in the Guide 
to the BC Mental Health Act). 
 
Q: What if criminal behavior is involved, as well as 
apparent mental disorder? For a minor offence, police 
have limited discretion to informally divert the subject 
to a hospital, or arrest and take the subject to a police 
lockup, where the subject can have a medical 
examination. The court has several options including 
diversion, remand, or stay of proceedings. Possible 
outcomes: Acquittal; Conviction; Unfit to stand trial or 
Not Criminally Responsible due to Mental Disorder, 
with committal to Forensic Hospital; or conditional 
release orders.  
 
Q: What if the situation does not meet police 
criteria for intervention?  a) Advise the family or 
friends about alternative intervention via judicial 
warrant, which has broader criteria (aimed at 
preventing substantial mental or physical deterioration, 
or protecting the person or others). Anyone can apply 
for a warrant to a judge or justice of the peace using 
Form 9, (see pages 62-3 in the Guide to the BC Mental 
Health Act); b) Telephone the subject’s doctor or case 
worker or family; c) Refer the subject to a Mental 
Health Center, outreach, advocacy, consumer support 
groups, or after-hours emergency mental health 
services. 
 
Q: What if subject is unruly at hospital?  Police 
have authority to help control an unruly subject. Police 
need to attend at hospital until authorized medical 
staff can take over custody safely.  
 
Editor’s Note: The Police Academy would like to thank 
Mr. Richard Dolman for his contribution of the 6 part 
Mental Health Act series adapted exclusively for the 
“In Service:10-8” newsletter. 
 
POLICE PAY USER TO TAG 
DEALER: NO ABUSE OF 
PROCESS 
R. v. Win, 2001 BCCA 604 
 
The accused sold crack cocaine to an 
undercover police officer on seven 
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accused sold the officer 15.4 grams 
of crack cocaine for $1,225. Prior to 
6
 the purchases, the police received information that the 
accused was selling crack cocaine out of his Quick Stop 
Food Store. The officer attended the store, advised 
he wished to make a purchase, produced a $20 bill, but 
the accused informed the officer that he did not know 
what the officer was talking about. About one month 
later, the officer went to a nearby pub and asked a 
group of labourers where he could “score”; the officer 
did not mention crack cocaine nor ask anyone to obtain 
drugs for him. One of the labourers offered to buy the 
officer a rock of crack for $25 but would not take the 
officer to the source. The officer gave the man the 
money and the man left. The officer exited the pub 
and observed the man coming out of the accused’s 
store. The man delivered the cocaine to the officer 
and informed him that he obtained it from “a store at 
the corner”. The officer left the pub and attempted a 
direct purchase from the accused but was 
unsuccessful. About two weeks later the officer 
returned to the pub and gave another man $45 for the 
delivery of 2 rocks of cocaine. The following day a 
third man in the pub took the officer to the store and 
introduced him to the accused. In exchange for the 
introduction, the officer agreed to pay the third man a 
small fee. As a result, the officer subsequently made 
several purchases from the accused. 
 
The accused argued that the officer committed an 
illegal act by paying the three private citizens (two in 
obtaining the drugs, one for the introduction) and was 
therefore aiding and abetting the men, who were not 
employed as police agents. In doing so, it was 
contended that the police conduct amounted to an 
abuse of process and the accused was entitled to a 
judicial stay of proceedings. In agreeing with the trial 
judge’s conclusion that there was no abuse of process, 
the BCCA dismissed the accused’s appeal finding the 
conduct of the police “would not shock the conscience 
of the community”:  
 
[The officer] did not recruit the three men to commit a 
criminal offence for him. He simply responded to their 
offers to assist him in the purchase of drugs. It is 
common practice for undercover drug officers to make 
contact with drug dealers through drug users. In my 
opinion there was no illegality in the conduct of [the 
officer] in his dealings with the men in the pub. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
 
 
 
APARTMENT ENTERED & 
SEARCHED W/O WARRANT: 
EVIDENCE ADMITTED  
R. v. Hofung (2001), 
Docket:C31904 (OntCA) 
 
An undercover police officer purchased 
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heroin several times from a suspect. 
During a culminating drug deal ending 
the 4-month undercover drug 
investigation, police arrested one 
suspect in a car outside an apartment and a second 
suspect in the lobby of the same apartment building 
after he had exited an apartment unit. The officers 
concluded that this unit was the source of the drugs, 
that a quantity of drugs remained inside the apartment, 
and the person who supplied the drugs to the two 
arrested suspects was in the unit. Police forced entry 
into the apartment without a warrant and arrested the 
accused. Several firearms were observed in a bedroom 
cabinet. Police secured the apartment and obtained a 
search warrant to seize the weapons. Police also located 
two loaded handguns under a couch in the living room. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal assumed (without deciding) 
that the warrantless police entry and search of the 
apartment was a violation of s.8 Charter. Following a  
s.24(2) Charter analysis (in deciding if the admission of 
the evidence would bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute) the Court admitted the evidence. In 
admitting the evidence, the Court recognized that “a 
warrantless arrest and search incidental thereto in a 
private dwelling is a serious Charter violation” but the 
police had “well-founded” concerns “about weapons inside 
the apartment” in light of the unfolding events that day.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca. 
 
CLASS 84 GRADUATES 
 
The Police Academy is pleased to 
announce the successful 
graduation of recruit Class 84 as 
qualified municipal constables on 
November 16, 2001. 
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Congratulations to Cst. Derek Hill 
(Vancouver), who was the recipient of 
the British Columbia Association of 
Chiefs of Police Shield of Merit for best 
all around recruit performance in basic 
training. Cst. Michael Thrower 
(Vancouver) received the Abbotsford Police Oliver 
Thomson Trophy for outstanding physical fitness. Cst. 
Mark Tasaka (Vancouver) was the recipient of the 
Vancouver Police Union Excellence in Academics award 
for best academic test results in all disciplines. Cst. 
Daniel Ames (Vancouver) received the British Columbia 
Federation of Police Officers Valedictorian award for 
being selected by his peers to represent his class at the 
graduation ceremony. Although not formally recognized 
at the graduation ceremony, Cst. Hans Dykman 
(Vancouver) was the recipient of the Abbotsford Police 
Recruit Marksmanship award for highest qualification 
score during Block III training (50/50). 
 
UPCOMING POLICE ACADEMY 
COURSES 
 
The 2002 calendar of courses 
and programs offered by the 
Police Academy at the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia is 
now available.  Call (604) 528-
5753 to have one mailed to you, 
or view it online at 
www.jibc.bc.ca. 
 
In addition to the regularly scheduled in-service 
courses offered by Advanced Programs at the Police 
Academy, several specialty courses are being offered 
in 2002 that are open to all members: 
 
• LSI Course on Scientific Content Analysis 
(Statement Analysis) 
February 12 – 14, 2002 Basic course, $775 per 
participant. 
February 18 – 19, 2002 Advanced course, $665 per 
participant 
 
• LSI Course on Art of the Confession 
February 20 – 21, 2002, $665 per participant 
 
• Reid Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation 
April 22 – 24, 2002, Basic course, $540 per 
participant 
April 25, 2002, Advanced course, $220 per 
participant 
 
Note: for participants who register for both the Reid 
Technique courses, a reduced registration rate of $710 
is available. 
 
To register, contact the Justice Institute of British 
Columbia Registration Office at (604) 528-5590.  
Registration is open to all members.  Course 
participants will receive a receipt for income tax 
purposes. 
 
 
LACK OF POLICE CANDOUR 
RESULTS IN ACQUITTAL 
R. v. Owen, 
 (2001) Docket:C32794 (OntCA) 
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal 
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Cst. Christopher Berda 
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accused who had been found guilty 
of assaulting a police officer and 
sentenced to 22 days in jail and one 
ear probation. The Court found the trial judge had 
rred when he applied a different standard in 
ssessing the credibility of the accused than that of 
he police officers. In this case, the trial judge 
ejected the evidence of the accused largely on the 
rounds of his demeanour and identified only one minor 
ontradiction; whether the blinds in the room where 
he assault occurred were open or closed. The police 
fficers denied collaborating in the preparation of 
8
 their notes although the trial judge found they had. 
Despite this flaw in the police officer’s credibility 
evidenced by their lack of candour and the “importance 
of their notes as a record of the alleged assault”, the 
OntCA found the trial judge “took a much more lenient 
approach when assessing the evidence of the police 
officers despite a serious weakness in their testimony”. 
In doing so, the trial judge committed a legal error in 
applying a stricter standard of scrutiny to the accused 
than he did to the Crown witnesses. As a result, the 
Appeal Court entered an acquittal. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca. 
 
 
IMPORTANCE OF OFFICER’s  
NOTES UNDERSCORED 
R. v. Hallman, 2001 BCSC 1355 
 
Police received an anonymous Crime 
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second tip as an “update” without confirmation the two 
Crime Stoppers tips were from the same source.  
 
In addition, the officer failed to describe the smell 
detected as “growing” marihuana, although the J.P. 
wrote this into the information. The JP also added an 
additional statement about the officer’s familiarity 
with marihuana growing operations. Although the 
officer testified the additions were made before the 
information was sworn, it was apparent from the face 
of the affidavit that it was re-sworn following the 
addition of the amendments. The only note in the 
officer’s notebook was “checked and signed by JP”.  
 
After returning to the police office and briefing other 
officers, police attended to the residence to execute 
the warrant where the front door of the residence was 
kicked in. One officer testified police knocked while a 
second officer could not recall whether he knocked or 
rang the doorbell. The only note in the officer’s 
V
DStoppers tip that a person named 
“John”, who drove a later model 
Corvette, was growing marihuana. A 
olice officer walked by the premises, noted no odour 
f marihuana, and thus considered the tip to be 
nsubstantiated. Another Crime Stoppers tip was 
eceived and the tipster provided a licence number of 
he Corvette. Police queried the license number and 
ound it to be registered to the accused. The officer 
ttended the residence and picked up the garbage bag 
et out in the alley, examined its contents, and found it 
o contain an airline ticket and employment insurance 
tatement in the accused’s name and some empty 
ontainers of nutrients for hydroponics. Again, no 
dour of marihuana was detected. The following day 
he officer went onto the neighbour’s property, with 
ermission, and smelled growing marihuana and 
bserved one basement window covered with material 
nd the upstairs inside drapes closed; no condensation 
as observed. Police made no notes of the visit. The 
ollowing day police attended a justice of the peace 
ith an unsworn information containing the basic 
nformation; but there was material facts not disclosed 
uch as; no smell of marihuana on the day the officer 
xamined the garbage bag, police checks of the name 
nd vehicle provided no further information, 
ondensation was not noted on any of the visits, the 
nformation stated the basement windows were 
overed when the officer only observed one of the 
hree windows, and the information described the 
notebook was “hard entry”. Among other issues, the 
accused argued both his s.8 and s.10 rights were 
infringed on the following basis: 
 
• conduct of the J.P. (s.8) 
• sufficiency of the information to obtain (s.8) 
• the no-knock procedure (s.8) 
• denial of access to counsel (s.10) 
 
Conduct of the JP 
 
The Court found the justice of the peace had crossed 
the line between remaining impartial and becoming an 
agent of the police when he actively suggested material 
changes to the information to obtain and made the 
additions himself after the affidavit had been sworn. 
The manner in which the warrant was issued was 
unreasonable and thus a violation of the accused’s s.8 
right to be secure from unreasonable search and 
seizure.  
 
Sufficiency of Information 
 
In addressing whether the information itself was 
sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant, 
the Court was not satisfied the information was 
reliable because of misleading assertions and the 
failure to mention material facts. After excising the 
unreliable information, the only item left was the 
nutrient label found in the garbage. This alone was 
insufficient to justify the search and therefore the 
search was unreasonable. 
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 No-Knock Procedure 
 
With respect to the entry, the Court found the manner 
of entry was unreasonable because the police failed to 
first knock and announce their presence prior to entry. 
The officer’s lack of notes and the accused’s testimony 
that he was a light sleeper and awakened by a loud bang 
(the door being kicked in) was sufficient to convince 
the Court police failed to knock: 
 
I conclude that the police entered the residence without 
first knocking. The door was kicked open with one blow 
that awakened the accused in his bedroom down the hall 
on the main floor. The unlawfulness of this entry into a 
private residence has been made clear in British Columbia 
in several authorities….There was no real threat of 
violent behavior here and no real attempt by police to 
suggest that there was. Nor was any other explanation 
offered for the conduct. (references omitted) 
 
Access to Counsel 
 
The accused argued that his right to counsel was 
violated because he was denied an opportunity to call 
counsel at the time of his arrest; at his home. The 
officer testified the accused said he would call his 
lawyer at the police station. The Court found the 
accused failed to establish his right to counsel was 
violated commenting the notes of the officer were 
“clear, made contemporaneously, and were 
unchallenged”.  
 
In excluding the evidence and acquitting the accused, 
the Court stated, at para.46: 
 
The evidence obtained is real evidence of a relatively 
unsophisticated marihuana grow operation. It existed 
irrespective of the violations. In this case, the violations 
are serious. The justice of the peace erred in his duty of 
impartiality. The officers failed to provide full and frank 
disclosure to the issuing justice of the peace, following a 
practice of providing only information that furthered the 
investigation without regard to whether the information 
undisclosed was of a material fact. The hard entry to a 
residential premise is always a serious matter especially 
when no satisfactory explanation is offered. This is 
compounded here by the fact that police obtained the 
search warrant in a manner that violated the accused’s s. 
8 Charter rights. Exclusion of the evidence is warranted 
here despite the seriousness of the charges given the 
seriousness of the combined breaches. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
BAD HEADACHE NO EXCUSE 
FOR GUILTY PLEA 
R. v. Eastmond, 
(2001) Docket:C33638 (OntCA) 
 
The accused, who was represented 
by counsel, pled guilty to assault. 
During the preparation of a pre-
sentence report, the accused 
advised the probation officer he 
knew his actions were “inappropriate” but denied 
portions of his statement to police and stated he only 
pled guilty because his lawyer told him to do so. As a 
result, the accused’s lawyer withdrew, and new counsel 
argued that his guilty plea should be struck because 
the accused did not understand the proceedings, was 
confused, upset, and he had a bad headache when he 
pled guilty. The accused had a grade six education, his 
ability to read and write English was limited, and he 
had been before the criminal courts on four previous 
occasions. In rejecting the accused’s appeal that the 
guilty plea should be struck, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal found the accused failed to discharge the onus 
of establishing the plea was invalid: 
 
A guilty plea entered in open court, particularly by an 
accused represented by counsel, is presumed to be a valid 
plea.  An accused seeking to set aside that plea bears the 
onus of demonstrating that the plea is not valid.  There is 
nothing in the record of the proceedings in which the 
plea was entered that raises any concern about the 
validity of the plea, or which would have necessitated 
that the trial judge make some specific inquiries of the 
appellant personally to satisfy himself that the plea was 
valid.  The facts read in by the Crown were 
straightforward, simple and fully supported the 
allegation.  The accused pleaded guilty personally and was 
represented by experienced counsel who acknowledged in 
open court the correctness of the facts referred to by 
the Crown. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
ODOUR OF MARIHUANA 
JUSTIFIES SEARCH 
R. v. Cornell, 2001 BCPC 265 
 
Police were working a Counterattack 
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December 2001 roadblock when they stopped a 
vehicle driven by a male and 
occupied by the accused. The 
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 officer attending to the driver’s side of the vehicle 
“discerned the smell of smoked marihuana emanating 
from the vehicle”.  As a result, the officer directed 
the driver to pull off to the side of the road. A second 
officer also attended to the vehicle and spoke to the 
passenger (the accused).  The officer asked the driver 
to step from the vehicle, searched him and the vehicle, 
but found nothing. The cover officer dealing with the 
accused (passenger) also detected a “fresh smell of 
smoked marihuana” emanating from the vehicle, and 
after asking the accused to exit the vehicle and 
entering into a conversation smelled smoked marihuana 
on the breath of the accused. The officer formed the 
opinion he had reasonable grounds to believe an 
offence had just been, or was being committed. The 
officer detained the accused for possession of a 
controlled substance, provided the appropriate 
warnings, and searched him.  The officer found a white 
substance believed to be cocaine on the accused that 
led to the charges before the Court. 
 
The accused argued the odour of marihuana emanating 
from a motor vehicle together with the smell of 
marihuana on the breath of the person did not justify 
the personal search of the accused. In rejecting the 
accused’s submission, the Court held, at para. 17: 
 
…when a person detects an odour of marihuana, there is a 
reasonable causal connection to believe that the person 
who is in a confined space from which the odour is 
emanating may reasonably be suspected to have been 
involved in the creation of the smoke. 
 
And further at para. 21: 
 
The question is whether experienced police officers who 
detect a distinct odour of smoked marihuana have 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an 
offence has been committed or is still being committed. 
In all the circumstances that are described to me in this 
case, it is my view that [the officer] had reasonable and 
probable grounds to form that belief, to detain, and to 
undertake a search incidental to that detention. 
 
In finding the search lawful, the cocaine evidence was 
admitted and the accused was convicted. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“Just because it’s common sense doesn’t mean it’s 
common practice.”  Will Rogers 
B.C.’s TOP COURT RULES LAW 
OFFICE WARRANT PROVISION 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BUT 
SUSPENDS REMEDY  
Festing v. Canada, 2001 BCCA 612 
 
In a 2-1 decision the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal struck 
down the provisions of s.488.1 of 
the Criminal Code respecting the 
mechanism for claiming solicitor-
client privilege of documents seized from law offices 
under a warrant. Furthermore, the Court found “that 
s. 487 of the Code breaches s. 8 of the Charter to 
the extent that it authorizes the search of law 
offices and the seizure of documents therein in the 
absence of adequate safeguards for solicitor-client 
privilege”; safeguards s.488.1 does not adequately 
address. As a remedy, the Court held the words 
“other than a law office” should be read into the 
provisions of s.487: 
 
s.487(1) Criminal Code 
A justice who is satisfied by information on oath in 
Form 1 that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that there is in a building, receptacle or place, other 
than a law office, . . . . 
 
However, the Court suspended both the striking 
down of s.488.1 and the reading in of “other than a 
law office” into s.487 pending the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in four related appeals 
originating from Ontario, Alberta, Newfoundland, and 
Nova Scotia scheduled to be heard this month. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
HIT & RUN: AVOIDING 
DETECTION DIFFERENT THAN 
AVOIDING IDENTIFICATION 
R. v. Perreault, 2001 BCSC 1481 
 
The accused was operating a vessel 
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display when his boat collided with 
another vessel at about 10:30 pm 
causing irreparable damage. 
Immediately following the accident, the accused asked 
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 the damaged vessel operator (victim) whether he had 
any insurance. The victim responded he did not. The 
accused provided a cell phone number of a friend who 
was on board another boat in English Bay who may be 
able to assist. The victim called the number but there 
was no response. The victim told the accused that his 
two passengers had been injured and that he was going 
to call 911. As he made the call, the accused left the 
area; he did not leave his name nor render any 
assistance. Four hours after the accident the accused 
called police to report the accident and ensure 
“everything was okay”.  
 
The accused testified to the following: the boat he 
collided with had no lights; during the collision he was 
knocked down and was cut over his eye; his passenger 
was hysterical and he believed she had a broken arm; 
he asked if the others on the victim’s boat were okay 
and received a response they were fine; he gave his 
friend’s cell phone number for assistance; he left 
because his passenger was panicky; he had no reason to 
believe the other people required assistance; and he 
had not given his name because no one asked for it. 
 
In its analysis, the Court acknowledged s.252 of the 
Criminal Code is to be read disjunctively; if the accused 
fails to do any one of the activities prescribed by the 
section, it is presumed their failure to do so was for 
the intent to escape criminal or civil liability. The Court 
dismissed the accused’s appeal and accepted the trial 
judge’s rejection of the accused’s evidence as to why 
he left the scene of the collision without leaving his 
name and address: 
The evidence that the [accused] telephoned the police to 
report the accident four hours after the event is not 
incongruent with a finding that at the time he left the 
scene of the collision without giving his name or address 
he did so “to avoid detection and with intent to avoid civil 
or criminal liability or both”.  
Additionally, in my view, the evidence that the [accused] 
provided the cellular telephone number of a friend… 
through which it may have been possible to eventually 
have identified him is also not incongruent with the trial 
judge’s ultimate finding. The term “avoiding detection” is 
not synonymous with avoiding identification. Avoiding 
detection has a broader meaning than avoiding 
identification and includes the notion of taking action to 
avoid the detection of facts which may lead to criminal or 
civil liability. For example, if an accused is intoxicated 
and stops at the scene of an accident he is involved in, 
but leaves before the police arrive it could be concluded 
that he left to avoid detection of his condition but not 
necessarily his identity. 
The [accused’s] removal of himself from the scene 
without leaving a name or address would have the effect 
of preventing an immediate follow-up on his state or his 
or his passenger’s immediate version of the events by any 
investigating authority and could impede the progress of 
any investigation into his civil or criminal liability.  
Although the [accused] did leave information … (his 
friend’s cellular telephone number) that may have led to 
his identification eventually, that has been held 
insufficient to discharge the duty in s. 252(1). (emphasis 
added) 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
SENIOR OFFICER 
CHALLENGES APPOINTMENT 
OF CHIEF & DEPUTY 
Stuckel v. Abbotsford Police Board, 
2001 BCSC 1492 
 
A senior police officer with the 
Abbotsford Police Department 
recently had his application in 
Supreme Court to set aside the 
Police Board’s appointment of a new 
Chief Constable and Deputy Chief Constable dismissed. 
Following the resignation of the former police chief, 
the Police Board did not announce the vacancies nor 
conduct a competition prior to appointing the new chief 
and deputy. The senior officer argued that the police 
board was obligated to hold a competition for the 
vacant positions and their failure to do so was unfair. 
In dismissing the application, Grist J. stated: 
The petitioner's application rests upon there being a duty 
owed to him by the Police Board requiring a process of 
appointment that would make the Chief Constable and 
Deputy Chief Constable positions the subject of a 
competition open to the Senior Officers of the 
Department. [T]his obligation can only be found in 
circumstances where a legitimate expectation of such a 
practise is founded on the past conduct of the Board or 
on a personal assurance to the petitioner.  
The material falls short of establishing a personal 
assurance. The petitioner's evidence is that on an earlier 
occasion he was encouraged to remain with the 
Abbotsford force by the former Chief Constable. He was 
told that if he remained with Abbotsford he could 
expect advancement. At its strongest, this assurance 
does not stipulate any particular process nor could the 
Chief Constable bind the Board in its power to appoint to 
the two senior positions. 
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 And further: 
Lastly, the evidence of past appointments does not 
demonstrate a practise of conducting competitions in 
every case, preceding senior appointments. The Board has 
relied in the past on assessments formed as a result of 
previous competitions rather than calling for new 
competitions. The impugned appointments appear to have 
been determined in like fashion. The past experience 
cannot therefore found a legitimate expectation of a 
competition in this instance. Accordingly, the petitioner's 
application must be dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
SEARCH INCIDENT TO 
ARREST DOES NOT REQUIRE 
INDEPENDENT GROUNDS TO 
SEARCH 
R. v. Le, 2001 BCCA 658 
 
Police received information from a 
reliable informant that narcotics 
were being sold from a rooming 
house. As a result, the officer 
walked by and observed a few people 
push a buzzer on the building, enter, and exit shortly 
thereafter. The officer was familiar with the building 
from a drug search conducted several years earlier. 
The following day the officer set up surveillance and in 
a 50 minute period observed 8 people push the buzzer, 
enter, and “a moment or two later” exit. One of the 
persons was observed smoking crack cocaine after 
leaving. The next day, an undercover officer went to 
the building and made a purchase from an occupant of 
the upstairs suite. Another officer also had 
independently received information from an informant 
about drug trafficking occurring at the building. Police 
applied for and obtained a warrant to search the upper 
rear suite of the building. During the time police were 
obtaining a warrant, police observed 12 other people 
enter and exit the building.  
 
Police executed the warrant and an officer, who was 
the last officer to enter the suite, found the accused 
just inside the front door. Among three other persons 
arrested in the suite, the accused was arrested for 
possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of 
trafficking and advised of his rights. The officer who 
arrested the accused turned him over to a second 
officer who identified the accused from a driver’s 
licence that showed an address other than the one 
being searched. The officer found a key to the suite, 
$2840 in his front pocket including $140 buy money 
used by police earlier, $465 in his wallet, and a book 
containing only handwritten figures and calculations. At 
trial the accused was convicted on three counts of 
possession for the purpose of trafficking. The trial 
judge found the search was not unreasonable because, 
even if the officer did not have reasonable grounds 
with respect to the accused, he at least had an 
articulable cause and the resulting search would be 
lawful as an incident to the detention for weapons or 
evidence. 
 
The accused appealed his conviction arguing the police 
violated his rights to be secure from unreasonable 
search and seizure. It was asserted the accused’s mere 
presence in the suite for which the police had a search 
warrant was insufficient to provide reasonable grounds 
for arrest. The accused submitted the police lacked 
reasonable grounds to arrest him “because there was 
no information which identified him as one of the 
persons involved in the drug trafficking activities 
taking place from the premises before the police 
executed the search warrant”.  Thus, if the arrest was 
unlawful the resulting search would be unreasonable 
and therefore the fruits of the search are 
inadmissible. In dismissing the accused’s appeal, the 
BCCA found the police had the requisite grounds for 
arrest. It was not necessary for the police to have 
identified all the persons involved in the drug 
trafficking activities to support reasonable grounds 
that persons within the premises were involved. As a 
result, the subsequent search was valid as an incident 
to lawful arrest. Rowles J.A. for a unanimous court: 
The scope of the long-standing common law power of 
search incident to a lawful arrest was first considered by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Cloutier v. Langlois …. 
That case established that a search incident to arrest 
does not require reasonable and probable grounds beyond 
the grounds that were sufficient to support the 
lawfulness of the arrest itself.  
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The power to arrest, and the power to search as an 
incident of arrest, are analytically distinct. The doctrine 
of search incident to a valid arrest is not founded upon 
considerations of reasonable grounds to search but 
rather flows from the fact of the arrest itself, and the 
need to prevent the escape of the arrested person, to 
check for the presence of weapons, and "... the prompt 
and effective discovery and preservation of evidence 
relevant to the guilt or innocence of the arrested 
person": …. An officer searching need not have any 
 reasonable grounds for believing that the search will be 
productive of evidence of the offence or of weapons: … 
The power to search upon arrest depends, however, upon 
the existence of proper underlying grounds for a lawful 
arrest. The search must have been carried out as a valid 
"incident" of that arrest, and the search must be carried 
out in a reasonable manner: … (references omitted, 
emphasis added) 
With respect to the trial judges comments concerning 
the search for contraband as a result of the 
investigative detention supported by articulable cause, 
the BCCA found the judge erred in this regard: 
[I]nvestigative detention does not provide a foundation 
for a search for contraband”. (emphasis added) 
Searches incident to investigative detention are only 
proper if conducted for safety reasons2. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
THE PRINCIPLE OF 
ABANDONMENT: SEIZING 
GARBAGE 
Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 
Because s.8 of the Charter 
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issued without the information obtained from the search 
of the garbage bags.  The court held that placing the 
material in the garbage signified that the material was 
no longer something of value or importance to the person 
disposing of it and there was no longer a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in respect of it3. However, 
garbage collected from a garbage can inside a hotel 
room still occupied by a person was a seizure because it 
was not yet abandoned (the person maintained control 
over the garbage and therefore, a privacy interest in 
it)4. In R. v. Wells (2001) Docket:C13744 (Ont.C.A.), 
police rented a hotel room that had been previously 
rented by a suspect in their murder investigation. Inside 
the room police found evidentiary items (including a t-
shirt and jeans with blood stains) which were collected. 
The Court held: 
 
2
 
In my view, the evidence reasonably supported the 
conclusion that, in his haste to leave the jurisdiction, the 
[accused] abandoned the items left in his hotel room. 
Furthermore, the appellant was delinquent in his rental 
payments and he probably was not maintaining any further 
lawful possession interest in his personal belongings in the 
hotel room. (emphasis added) 
 
Where a person does not have an expectation of privacy 
in a discarded item, such as a tissue obtained by police 
for DNA testing, the item is not seized by police but is 
gathered, and is admissible as an exhibit in the trial5. 
 
V
Dfocuses on a person's 
reasonable expectation of 
privacy, a person who 
deliberately abandons or 
discards material may no 
longer have a subjective 
expectation of privacy 
oncerning the material.  Any s.8 Charter issue will focus 
n whether the accused maintains any privacy interest in 
he thing abandoned or discarded.  If the Crown can 
stablish that the thing was “abandoned” (i.e. the 
ccused relinquished their privacy interest in the thing) 
hen there is no seizure and s. 8 does not apply.  In R. v. 
rist (1995) 100 C.C.C. (3d) 58 (B.C.C.A.), police seized 
wo garbage bags that were left on the curbside for 
anitation pick up at a residence the police had 
nformation was the site of a marihuana grow operation. 
he seizure of the garbage bags by police was described 
s "entirely speculative". After examining the contents 
f the bags, the police applied for and were granted a 
earch warrant that would not have otherwise been 
                                                
 See Volume 1 Issue 7 of this publication. 
Caution must be taken when relying on the principle of 
abandonment respecting persons who are in the custody 
and control of the police. In R. v. Stillman [1997] 1 S.C.R. 
607, the police seized the tissue used by the accused to 
blow his nose (for DNA testing) while he was in police 
custody at the police station. The accused had earlier 
refused to provide bodily samples. In addressing the 
issue of abandonment in this circumstance Cory J. for 
the majority at para.58: 
 
The difficulty with this argument [of abandonment] is that 
when an accused person is in custody, the production of 
bodily samples is not an unforeseen occurrence. It is simply 
the inevitable consequence of the normal functioning of 
the human body. The police are only able to profit from 
the production of the samples because the accused is 
continuously under surveillance. For this reason it is 
somewhat misleading to speak of “abandonment” in the 
context of evidence obtained from an accused who is in 
custody. 
 
                                                 
3 See also R. v. Hallman 2001 BCSC 1355. 
4 R. v. Love (1995) 102 C.C.C. (3d) 393 (Alta. C.A.) 
5 R. v. Legere (1994) 95.C.C.C. (3d) 139 (N.B.C.A.) at p.167. 
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 A person in custody will necessarily produce items 
containing bodily fluids and because of their custody will 
have no choice but to discard those substances in 
receptacles under police control. Whether a person 
relinquishes any privacy interest in the samples while in 
custody will be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
 
CUSTOMS ARREST BY 
MUNICIPAL OFFICER 
JUSTIFIED UNDER CODE 
R. v. Bienvenue,  
(2001) 155 CCC (3d) 442 (QueCA) 
 
The accused was stopped by a 
s. 104 of the Customs Act does not refer to the 
detention of people, but only to things. Thus the 
officer was not entitled to simply rely on s.104 as a 
power of detention. However, the municipal police 
officer was entitled to detain the accused by operation 
of s.99(1)(f) and s.104 of the Customs Act: 
 
In exercising their powers of search, seizure and 
detention of things, including conveyances, officers will 
generally-if not invariably-interfere with the freedom of 
movement of the persons whose conveyances are stopped 
for that purpose. 
 
Although a municipal police officer does not generally 
have the authority of an “officer” as defined in the 
Customs Act, s.104 allows an “officer” (which by 
definition includes an RCMP member but not a municipal municipal police officer after the 
officer received information from 
the RCMP that the accused entered 
Canada at a closed border crossing. The RCMP were 
alerted by the US Border Patrol after they detected 
the crossing through electronic sensing and 
photographic devices. The accused, who was driving a 4 
x 4 truck matching the description provided, was 
stopped 26 minutes after the detected crossing in an 
area in which there was little traffic. In the vehicle 
police located 200 bottles of wine from the United 
States. The accused argued he was illegally and 
arbitrarily detained contrary to the Charter, and that 
the ensuing search and arrest also violated his rights.  
 
The Customs Act creates a summary conviction offence 
for persons who fail to forthwith present themselves 
at the nearest customs office designated for that 
purpose that is open for business. In addition, anyone 
who fails to report all goods imported commits a dual 
offence. The Quebec Court of Appeal found the 
officer had reasonable grounds to believe an offence 
was committed and the grounds offered were both 
subjectively held and objectively verifiable. The 
officer had received information from the RCMP that 
he was entitled to rely upon and had made the stop at a 
time after the crossing when the accused could not 
have reported to an open Customs office. Since the 
officer believed the accused “was in the process of 
committing an offence under the [Customs] Act when 
he intercepted him”, he was therefore entitled to 
arrest pursuant to s.495 of the Criminal Code.  
 
Alternatively, the Court also reviewed the search, 
seizure, and detention provisions of the Customs Act. 
In this regard, the Court found the word “detention” in 
member) to call on other persons to assist in exercising 
any power of search, seizure or detention. Any person 
so called upon is authorized to exercise these powers. 
In this case, the RCMP called upon the municipal police 
for assistance. Thus, the municipal officer acting under 
s.104 was entitled to detain the accused by operation 
of s.99(1)(f) which permits the stopping and searching 
of conveyances.  
 
OFFICER PROTECTED WHEN 
ACTING ON INVALID  
CPIC ENTRY 
Lord v. A.G. Canada et al,  
2001 BCSC 212 
 
The plaintiff sued the Abbotsford 
Police Department, among others, 
p
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December 2001 alleging false arrest and false 
imprisonment arising from the 
arrest of the plaintiff. The 
laintiff’s wife also sought damages for nervous shock 
esulting from her husband’s arrest and imprisonment. 
he plaintiff was convicted of trespassing under the 
orrections and Conditional Release Act for refusing to 
eave Kent Institution where he was visiting his son, an 
nmate. The plaintiff was placed on probation for one 
ear with the condition that he not attend or enter any 
ederal institution in Canada. A RCMP detachment 
ntered the probation order on CPIC with the one-year 
xpiry date. The plaintiff appealed his sentence and his 
robation term was reduced by 6 months. 
nfortunately, CPIC was not updated and maintained 
he initial one-year probation order date. The plaintiff 
egan to visit his son again, this time at Matsqui 
15
 Institution. An incident occurred where the 
Abbotsford Police were called and the officer who 
attended queried the plaintiff on CPIC. On the basis of 
the outstanding probation order entered on CPIC, the 
officer arrested the plaintiff for breach of probation 
and took him to the police jail.  
 
 
The plaintiff informed the officer of the amended 
order, but was unable to produce a copy. While at the 
police office, the officer made two inquiries about the 
status of the probation order with the RCMP agency 
responsible for the CPIC entry. The officer was 
advised the probation order was still in effect and 
received a copy by fax. The plaintiff’s wife attended 
the Abbotsford Police Department and advised the 
station NCO that the probation order was no longer in 
effect. The NCO told the plaintiff’s wife that he would 
act on the new order if she could produce a copy. A 
relief NCO released the plaintiff after the plaintiff’s 
wife attended with a copy of the valid order. In 
dismissing the action against the Abbotsford Police, 
the Court noted an arrest based on an invalid court 
order or warrant does not necessarily render the 
arrest a false arrest: 
 
In this case, the police officers acted in good faith on 
what they considered to be a valid warrant under the 
authority of CPIC. They listened to [the plaintiff’s] 
protests and made diligent inquiries to determine if the 
Probation Order was defective. They asked him to 
produce the documentation and they asked him if he 
wanted to speak to a lawyer. They believed that if they 
released him, he would return to the Institution and 
continue committing the offence. It was unfortunate 
that because the incident occurred on November 11, a 
statutory holiday, the Court Registry was closed. He was 
released when [the plaintiff’s wife] produced the 
necessary documentation to show that he was not in 
breach of the apparently valid Probation Order. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
DIVERSITY IN POLICING 
CONFERENCE 
JANUARY 25-26, 2002 
JIBC 
“Working Together for 
Policing, along with the British 
Columbia Association of Chiefs of 
Police and the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia (JIBC), will be 
hosting the “2002 Diversity in 
Policing Conference” at the JIBC. 
 
The conference will emphasize the importance of 
diversity in policing and will examine the following 
values: 
• understanding individual communities better 
• building valuable trusting relationships 
• safety and security 
• community representation 
• proactively solving community concerns 
• community policing in action 
• responsive and sensitive police service 
• communities policing communities 
• the police are the community, the community 
are the police 
• partners for life 
• stronger together 
 
Location:     JIBC 
       715 McBride Blvd.  
                   New Westminster, BC 
 
There is no charge for this conference. 
 
As the facilities can only hold a maximum number 
of people, registration is required to reserve a 
seat. Please contact the conference coordinator, 
S/Sgt. Murray Lunn, via email at mslunn@jibc.bc.ca 
to register and please be prepared to provide the 
following information:  
• name  
• rank 
• organization 
• postal address  
• telephone number 
• email address. 
 
Once all seats have been reserved, we will maintain 
a waiting list in the event a seat becomes available. 
 
For more information, check out the Police 
Academy website at www.jibc.bc.ca or contact the 
coordinator, S/Sgt. Murray Lunn at (604) 528-
5824. 
  
Safety & Security” 
 
The British Columbia Special 
Committee on Diversity and 
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